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ABSTRACT 
Distributed systems are prone to attacks, called Sybil attacks, wherein an adversary may 
generate an unbounded number of bogus identities to gain control over the system.  In 
this thesis, an algorithm, DownhillFlow, for mitigating such attacks is presented and 
tested experimentally.  The trust rankings produced by the algorithm are significantly 
better than those of the distributed SybilGuard protocol and only slightly worse than 
those of the best-known Sybil defense algorithm, ACL.  The results obtained for ACL are 
consistent with those obtained in previous studies.  The running times of the algorithms 
are also tested and two results are obtained: first, DownhillFlow’s running time is found 
to be significantly faster than any existing algorithm including ACL, terminating in 
slightly over one second on the 300,000-node DBLP graph.  This allows it to be used in 
settings such as dynamic networks as-is with no additional functionality needed.  Second, 
when ACL is configured such that it matches DownhillFlow’s speed, it fails to recognize 
large portions of the input graphs and its accuracy among the portion of the graphs it does 
recognize becomes lower than that of DownhillFlow. 
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I – INTRODUCTION 
i) Statement of the Problem 
Distributed systems are prone to what is called the Sybil attack [13], where an adversary 
may generate an unbounded number of fake identities, called Sybil identities, to gain 
control over the system.  This attack is applicable to practically any type of distributed 
system where users may organize into a trust network.  These systems can differ in size, 
connectivity, the presence of a central authority, or any number of other factors.  On a 
small scale, threats such as spam attacks are applicable pretty much anywhere.  On a 
larger scale, social networks such as Facebook [16] can span millions, and even billions, 
of users, and suffer from the threat of fake accounts created to spam honest users, forge 
identities or any other range of uses.  Furthermore, Sybil attacks can carry harmful 
consequences: applications such as P2P file sharing with no trusted authority run the risk 
of data loss if an adversary can compromise enough of the system to outvote honest 
users.  
 
A wide literature of protocols aiming to help mitigate such attacks – which are commonly 
referred to as “Sybil defense” protocols – has developed.  In this thesis, we investigate 
Sybil defense mechanisms as well.  We focus on Sybil defense protocols that are based 
upon flow algorithms and their variants.  To our knowledge, we are the first to do so; 
most Sybil defense protocols rely on random walks and their associated properties and 
distributions.   
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Sybil defense protocols fall into two major categories: 1) protocols that allow a honest 
user to “accept” or “reject” any other node in the trust network [24, 28, 29], and 2) 
protocols that allow an honest user to generate a full “trust ranking” 𝑡 across all other 
nodes [3, 10, 11, 15].  In the former case, the robustness of a protocol – how accurately it 
can distinguish honest nodes from Sybils – is assessed qualitatively using such metrics as 
the number of Sybil node accepted per attack edge and the number of false positives 
(honest nodes declared Sybil by the protocol).  In the latter case, the robustness of a 
protocol is assessed using such metrics as precision/recall or the area under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (abbreviated ROC) curve of the trust ranking [14]. 
 
While most recent approaches focus on the latter case, as we do, there is also a severe 
lack of consistency within the literature regarding how the robustness of the Sybil 
defense protocols are actually judged.  Many protocols are individually claimed to be 
“optimal” and shown to achieve better results under the specific setup assumed by their 
underlying research.  Some studies [10] focus primarily on small graphs (less than 
100,000 nodes), sometimes using techniques such as BFS tracing to prune larger graphs 
down to a smaller size.  The simulations conducted by most studies often introduce only a 
small number of attack edges [10, 11, 24, 29], trust links where an honest user falsely 
trusts a Sybil node.  It is not clear if any of these techniques affect the robustness of the 
protocols at large, and it is difficult to obtain an “all-things-equal” comparison of the 
many protocols in the literature today.  Moreover, there is a lack of consistency regarding 
the structure of the social graphs assumed: while many protocols assume that the honest 
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region of the network is fast-mixing (we define this in section II), it was shown by 
Mohaisen et al. [19] that this does not appear to actually be true in practice, instead 
supporting a notion that social graphs fall into a “community” structure of several tightly-
knit subsets of nodes loosely connected with one another.  Some protocols [10, 28] claim 
that this does not affect the fast-mixing property of their input graphs.  Still others [24] 
assume an expander graph, a stronger condition than fast-mixing. 
 
For this reason, our study largely follows the framework laid out by Alvisi et al. in [3], 
which addresses many of these issues and serves as a baseline to work from.  We use 
precision/recall as our metric of choice and study the ACL community detection 
algorithm [4], which they showed to obtain near-optimal results on a variety of social 
graphs, as the current “leader”.  We aim both to 1) compare our results to those of ACL 
as well as other protocols and 2) demonstrate a replication of their results.  
 
Our main contribution is an algorithm, termed DownhillFlow, which achieves good 
results on a wide range of social graphs under the two models of attack defined in [3].  
We compare DownhillFlow to ACL and the distributed protocol SybilGuard, and find 
that DownhillFlow’s results are slightly less robust than ACL’s and noticeably more 
robust than SybilGuard’s.  Furthermore, DownhillFlow is very fast, taking slightly over 
1.2 seconds for the 310,000-node DBLP graph, compared to about 45 minutes for ACL.  
Moreover, if ACL is restricted to run for up to 4 seconds, its results are not as good as 
those of DF.  This performance advantage of DownhillFlow grows as the graph size 
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increases.  We also show how an unoptimized version of DownhillFlow can be adapted 
to form a distributed protocol, present ideas to adapt the missing optimizations to the 
distributed setting and show how certain limitations of the distributed DownhillFlow 
protocol can be addressed by drawing a link to a specialized version of the electronic 
cash problem.  Last, based on its running time, we propose several applications for 
DownhillFlow, the most promising of which is dynamic networks. 
 
ii) System Model and Preliminaries 
As customary in the literature, we model the system in terms of an unweighted, 
undirected graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸).  Nodes 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉 represent distinct (honest or Sybil) identities 
in the system, and an edge 𝑒 = 𝑢𝑣 represents a mutual trust connection between 𝑢 and 𝑣.  
𝐻 ⊆ 𝑉 is the set of honest identities in the system, while 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑉 is the set of Sybil 
identities.  For simplicity’s sake, we use “node” and “identity” interchangeably when 
describing honest and Sybil identities.  Nodes 𝑣 ∈ 𝑆 are Byzantine and all act under 
control of an adversary, an edge 𝑒 is called an attack edge if it has one endpoint in 𝐻 and 
the other in 𝑆.  We are interested in algorithms leveraging these trust links to distinguish 
honest nodes from Sybil nodes. 
 
We assume that the graph 𝐺 is static.  For a node 𝑣 ∈ 𝐺, we denote its neighbors as 𝑁(𝑣), 
its degree as deg⁡(𝑣) and its distance from a node 𝑢 as 𝑑𝑢(𝑣).  We use 𝑒𝑎 to denote the 
set of attack edges.  Throughout the thesis, we use 𝑡 to denote the trust vector obtained 
from a (fixed) source node 𝑠, which is assumed to be honest, and we use 𝑡𝑣 to denote the 
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trust obtained for a single 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉.   
 
We use two metrics from information theory, precision and recall.  For a trust vector 𝑡 
and any given position 𝑘, 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ |𝐻| + |𝑆|, the precision at position 𝑘 is defined to be 
the percentage of the 𝑘 highest-ranked nodes that are honest, and the recall is defined to 
be the percentage of honest nodes that appear in the 𝑘 highest-ranked nodes.  Thus, the 
two metrics trade off with each other: as a trust ranking recalls more honest nodes, it 
starts to accept a greater proportion of Sybil nodes as well, becoming less precise. 
 
We consider two models for simulating Sybil attacks, which we refer to as the random 
attack and the fixed attack.  Both were formalized by Alvisi et al. in [3], although the 
fixed attack model was previously employed in the literature.  These are described below: 
 
Random attack – In this model of attack, the Sybil region 𝑆 is configured to be an exact 
copy of 𝐻.  The adversary attempts to set up |𝐸| attack edges 𝑢𝑣 joining 𝑆 to 𝐻.  The 
endpoints 𝑢 and 𝑣 are chosen degree-preferentially, so for a node 𝑢, the probability of 
being chosen is 
deg(𝑢)
2|𝐸|
.  The attack edge is created with probability 𝑝, a parameter of the 
attack, and fails with probability 1 − 𝑝.  The expected number of attack edges is thus 
𝑝|𝐸|. 
 
Fixed attack – This model of attack takes two parameters (𝑔, 𝛾) as input, which represent 
a fixed number of attack edges and Sybil nodes to be created, respectively.  In this attack, 
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nodes in the honest region 𝐻 are randomly declared to be Sybil nodes until a total of 𝑔 
attack edges are reached, and from there, the Sybil region 𝑆 is built up using a scale-free 
topology, such as Barabasi-Alberts [1], until a total of 𝛾 Sybil nodes are reached.   
 
We consider both the centralized and distributed settings: in the centralized setting, a 
network operator with full knowledge of the graph topology picks a source 𝑠 ∈ 𝐻 
(determined, for instance, by manual verification) and runs the algorithm in a fully-
trusted manner.  In the distributed setting, a node 𝑠 ∈ 𝐻 wishes to obtain its trust vector 𝑡.  
It is assumed that each 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 is only aware of its neighbors⁡𝑁(𝑣) – the nodes it has 
selected to trust – and it is explicitly assumed here that the edge set 𝐸, whose size is often 
several orders of magnitude above the vertex set 𝑉, is too large to fit on one machine.  
Without this assumption, the distributed setting is not interesting as a source node 𝑠 can 
simply obtain a crawl of the entire graph.  A node 𝑣 in the distributed setting is identified 
by its public key 𝑃𝐾𝑣: for the sake of simplicity, we omit this step in discussion 
henceforth and refer to nodes directly.  We assume that the public key of the source 𝑃𝐾𝑠 
is known to all nodes, and also leave out the specifics required for nodes 𝑣 to forward 
messages back-and-forth to⁡𝑠.  Since Sybil nodes all act under control of an adversary, 
this means that under the distributed setting, the adversary controls all 𝑣 ∈ 𝑆.  However, 
we assume communication is reliable and that nodes⁡𝑣 ∈ 𝐻 are resilient to drop attacks 
(utilizing, for instance, timeout mechanisms). 
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iii) Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.  In section II, we give an overview of the 
field since the inception of the Sybil attack in [13].  We review most existing protocols, 
beginning from SybilGuard [29] and continuing through to the state of the art [xxxx, 3, 
10, 11, 24, 28, 29].  We present our algorithm in section III, and we discuss our 
experimental setup in section IV.  In section V, we present and discuss results both 
demonstrating the accuracy of our protocol and analyzing its running time performance.  
In section VI, we attempt to adapt our algorithm into a distributed protocol, both 
discussing a concrete approach with accumulators and showing a potential link to a 
specialized type of e-cash scheme, and discuss the limitations that arise when doing so.  
We discuss future work in section VII and conclude in section VIII.  
 
II – PREVIOUS WORK 
The Sybil attack was formalized by Douceur in [13].  Initial investigations led to a variety 
of results. Bazzi and Konjevod [6] discussed approaches levering the geometric structure 
of the network to identify nodes based on their locations, and Bazzi et al. [5] proposed a 
Sybil-resilient distance vector routing scheme, guaranteeing under most assumptions 
Sybil nodes could not report a distance from a source node 𝑠 lower than their actual 
distance.  Kamvar et al. [15] proposed the EigenTrust reputation system, wherein a node 
𝑣’s reputation is determined by ratings given by its neighbors, weighted in turn by the 
trust of the neighbors. 
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The first protocol leveraging the structure of the whole social graph to defend against 
Sybil attacks was SybilGuard [29], which was introduced in 2006 by Yu et al.  The key 
insight of SybilGuard is that if the honest subgraph is fast-mixing, then it is likely that 
two random walks originating from any two 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝐻 will intersect with each other.  We 
give a high-level definition of fast-mixing here and urge the reader to consult, for 
instance [19] for a more detailed discussion: 
 
Definition 1 (Fast-mixing): A graph 𝐺 is fast-mixing if a random walk starting from any 
𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 converges to the stationary distribution 𝜋, where 𝜋 is the degree-normalized 
uniform distribution (for each 𝑣𝑖 we have 𝜋𝑣𝑖 =
deg(𝑣𝑖)
2|𝐸|
), “quickly” – in 𝒪(log⁡|𝑉|) steps. 
 
They show how this can be done in a distributed manner by substituting the random 
walks with random routes.  Each node 𝑣 generates a random permutation 
𝑘1, 𝑘2, … 𝑘deg⁡(𝑣) of the set 1, 2, … deg⁡(𝑣) and forms a routing table as follows: if a 
random route enters 𝑣 along edge 𝑒𝑖, its next edge is determined by 𝑒𝑘𝑖.  They later 
improve on SybilGuard by introducing SybilLimit [28], the key advantage of which is 
that rather than running one, long random route of length 𝑙, they run many shorter routes 
of length 𝑤, each under a unique routing table.  They are able to show that this approach 
is sufficient to bound the number of Sybil nodes accepted to 𝒪(log|V|) per attack edge.  
However, their approach comes with the drawback that the input graphs must be pre-
processed by iteratively removing nodes with degree lower than 5.  This is required both 
to ensure fast-mixing and because a node 𝑣 runs a random route through each of its 
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outgoing edges, and as such the number of routes ran by one 𝑣 is constrained by its 
degree. 
 
Since then, multiple protocols were proposed.  SybilInfer [11] uses a Bayesian model to 
assess the likelihood that a random trace was initiated by honest nodes.  They claim their 
protocol works in the distributed setting, however Yu et al. point out [28] its design is 
incomplete.  Gatekeeper [24] is adapted from the SumUp [25] protocol, which was 
originally designed for online content voting.  In Gatekeeper, a source 𝑠 picks 𝑚 random 
nodes to act as ticket sources, each of which distributes 𝑡 tickets in a distributed manner; 
the value 𝑡 is adjusted adaptively in order to ensure enough nodes receive tickets and thus 
are accepted.  Gatekeeper claims to limit the number of Sybils accepted to 𝒪(1) per 
attack edge.  However: 1) they assume the input graph is an expander graph, a stronger 
condition than the fast-mixing widely assumed elsewhere, and 2) they require the input 
graphs satisfy an added balance criterion that restricts the outcome of their ticket 
distribution mechanism.  They essentially only provide guarantees on graphs that 
conform to a standard that suits their protocol.  
 
All of these protocols rely on the assumption that their input graphs are fast-mixing.  
Mohaisen et al. report in [19], however, concrete measurements on a variety of social 
graphs demonstrating that this assumption doesn’t hold in practice.  They report that the 
graphs that do turn out to be fast-mixing, such as Facebook, are online social networks 
where there is no special need to be careful about which friend requests are accepted.  
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But the graphs that rely on strong, out-of-band trust links assumed by SybilLimit-like 
protocols, such as DBLP, are not fast-mixing.  They also point out that the pre-processing 
step required by SybilGuard and SybilLimit is problematic: in some cases it causes over 
75% of the nodes to be denied service.  Viswanath et al. [27] report that social graphs 
more closely take on a structure of several, loosely coupled communities, each of which 
are individually tightly connected, and point out that community detection algorithms 
serve largely the same purpose as the random walks in prior protocols.  
 
The next protocol we consider, SybilRank [10], provides the insight that the landing 
distribution of an early-terminated random walk – namely, length 𝒪(log 𝑡), where 𝑡 is the 
mixing time of the honest region – gives honest nodes enough of an advantage over the 
stationary distribution to be effectively distinguished from Sybil nodes.  SybilRank works 
by initializing a fixed amount of trust on a given number of seed nodes, and utilizing 
power iteration to compute this distribution in an efficient manner: intuitively, rather than 
simulating many random walks, it computes the exact distribution one step at a time until 
𝑡 steps.  They heuristically set 𝑡 = log⁡|𝑉| and demonstrate how the community structure 
can be handled by manually distributing seed nodes across several communities.  They 
compare against several other protocols and Mislove’s community detection [18] 
algorithm.  This algorithm functions as a greedy heuristic: to identify a community 𝐶 of 
surrounding nodes, the algorithm repeatedly adds the neighbor 𝑣 ∈ 𝑁(𝐶) such that 
adding 𝑣 results in minimal normalized conductance (according to the expected value). 
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In [3], Alvisi et al. further investigate parallels between Sybil defense and community 
detection.  They select the ACL algorithm [4], proving that if the mixing time of a 
community 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑉 is sufficient, it allows for almost all honest 𝑣 ∈ 𝐶 to compute a trust 
ranking, the first |𝐶| positions of which consist almost entirely of honest nodes in⁡𝐶.  This 
is a significant improvement as it is the first result to mathematically address the issue of 
individual fast-mixing communities, rather than addressing only the mixing time of the 
entire honest region and proceeding on a best-effort basis.  They demonstrate that ACL 
achieves robust results on a variety of social graphs, formalize two models of simulation 
for Sybil attacks, and examine what happens under much stronger attacks than those 
assumed elsewhere in the literature; namely, their model scales according to graph size 
and introduces attack edges proportionally to the number of edges, not vertices (or 
constant), in the graph.  As an example, under the LiveMocha graph we use later with 𝑝 = 
0.1, their model induces |𝑒𝑎| > 200,000, whereas |𝑒𝑎| in other studies is assumed to be on 
the order of magnitude of thousands.  Even the empirical analysis of SybilLimit 
conducted by Yu et al. [28] shows that on all graphs, the number of Sybil nodes accepted 
→ |V| as |𝑒𝑎| approaches 100,000. 
 
We must also describe the ACL algorithm itself: rather than handling normal random 
walks, ACL approximates the degree-normalized distribution that a node is visited by a 
random walk of geometric random length.  At each step, the random walk has probability 
𝛼 of returning to the source node, called the jumpback parameter.  This provides many of 
the guarantees of random walk theory while prioritizing nodes close to the source node, 
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ranking more highly nodes in the same community as the source.  This distribution is 
approximated by a repeated series of steps wherein nodes take the correct amount of trust 
for themselves and propagate the remainder to their neighbors – for a more detailed 
discussion, refer to [4] or Alvisi’s implementation [3].  The running time of ACL is 
𝒪(
1
𝛼𝜖
), where 𝜖 is an error parameter setting how close the approximated distribution 
must be to the limit distribution; this creates a tradeoff between its speed and the 
robustness of its results.  We discuss this in more depth in sections IV and V. 
 
It is also worth discussing the SumUp vote collection protocol [25].  SumUp, the ticket 
distribution of which was reused in Gatekeeper, is, in fact, based around flow.  To collect 
𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 votes for an object, a source 𝑠 distributes 𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 tickets to a set 𝑇 of nodes through 
breadth-first search until 𝑇 has 𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 outgoing edges.  𝑠 then calculates a set of flow paths 
to the nodes 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 who have voted for that object.  These are combined within the flow 
envelope to create a flow of total capacity 𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥.  This is a different and more restricted 
problem than that of universal Sybil defense, however, since rather than evaluating the 
trustworthiness of any other node in the graph, it aims to select specifically 𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 nodes 
out of a predefined set of nodes the size of which is expected to be much smaller than the 
total number of nodes in the graph.  As such, this approach is not adaptable to the 
problem of universal Sybil defense, and in fact, Tran et al. report on these limitations 
themselves [24] when presenting Gatekeeper. 
 
The intuition behind why flow algorithms seem promising under the context of Sybil 
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defense is fairly straightforward.  Suppose we have a graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) with honest and 
Sybil subgraphs 𝐻 and 𝑆 respectively.  If 𝑠 ∈ 𝐻 and 𝑒𝑎 is the set of attack edges, then 𝑒𝑎 
defines a cut separating 𝐻 and 𝑆.  Therefore, if we can find an 𝑠, 𝑣-flow 𝑓 of value 
𝑓 > |𝑒𝑎|, we must necessarily have 𝑣 ∈ 𝐻.  Ideally, in this way, we could cleanly 
separate the nodes in 𝐻 from the nodes in 𝑆.  Furthermore, it is not known whether this 
approach requires as strong of a set of assumptions as those assumed in many random 
walk-based protocols, which is particularly important to handle the “community” 
structure found in social graphs in practice.   
 
III – OUR APPROACH 
a) “Naïve” Approach 
To get an intuition of a flow-based approach for Sybil defense, consider whether a 
standard maximum flow algorithm, such as Ford-Fulkerson or preflow-push, can provide 
good results in the context of Sybil defense.  The most obvious way to apply such 
algorithms to our problem is in the following manner: for a source node⁡𝑠 ∈ 𝐻, calculate 
the maximum flow to all other nodes 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 and set 𝑡𝑣 = 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑠, 𝑣). 
 
We find, however, that this approach is not sufficient.  We provide intuition why: for an 
attacked graph 𝐺, let 𝑒𝑎 be the set of attack edges, and let 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉.  Since 𝑠‘s trust value for 
𝑣, 𝑡𝑣, is the maximum flow from 𝑠 to⁡𝑣, it is equivalent to the minimum 𝑠, 𝑣-cut.  
However, we find that the capacity of the minimum 𝑠, 𝑣-cut is not bounded by |𝑒𝑎| as 
expected.  In fact, almost always, we have both deg⁡(𝑠) and deg(𝑣) < |𝑒𝑎|, meaning that 
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to find a smaller cut, we need only look at the edges incident to⁡𝑠 and 𝑣.  This means that 
this approach cannot possibly distinguish between honest and Sybil nodes: to do so, we 
need for honest nodes to attain a flow of at least |𝑒𝑎|.  As an example, on the epinions 
graph with 𝑝 = 0.01, we have |𝑒𝑎| ≈ 1,000, but 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 443.  When we consider the 
average degree and not the maximum, the outlook is even worse: we have 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 7.  
Indeed, in practice, we find that this does place a tight bound on the limiting cut for most 
𝑣, regardless of whether 𝑣 is honest or Sybil: for most 𝑣, we have 𝑡𝑣 = max⁡(deg⁡(𝑠), 
deg⁡(𝑣)).  
 
One possible way to mitigate this is to incorporate the neighbors of⁡𝑠 and 𝑣 into the flow 
calculation: meaning, calculate 𝑇1 = {𝑢 ∶ 𝑑𝑠(𝑢) ≤ 1}, 𝑇2 = {𝑢 ∶ 𝑑𝑣(𝑢) ≤ 1} and set 
𝑡𝑣 = 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑇1, 𝑇2).  However, we find this is still not sufficient: on average for the 
epinions graph, this only allows for 100~200 units of flow to be pushed from 𝑠 to 𝑣, still 
not enough to reach |𝑒𝑎|.  Moreover, this approach carries the risk that a source node 
𝑠 ∈ 𝐻 hoping to calculate its trust ranking will find that it is adjacent to the Sybil region, 
at which point the adversary can take an unlimited amount of flow from 𝑠. 
 
We conclude that by itself, the concept of maximum flow is insufficient to solve our 
problem.  We thus investigate algorithms that use flow as a core concept while being 
more specialized toward the goal of Sybil defense. 
 
 
 15 
b) Our Approach 
Our approach is based on the insight that if flow is only allowed to be pushed “downhill” 
– meaning, pushed uniformly to nodes at greater distance from the source node⁡𝑠 – then 
this leverages the assumption that the adversary’s ability to create attack edges is limited 
and provides multiple other properties suitable for Sybil defense.  (Note that since the 
flow is pushed uniformly, the flow is separated throughout the graph exponentially by 
BFS level.)  To illustrate this, if 𝑣 ∈ 𝑆 is a Sybil node with exactly one attack edge 𝑢𝑣, 
then the flow 𝑣 receives from the honest region of the graph will primarily come from the 
one attacked vertex 𝑢, since the flow passed to 𝑆 over attack edges elsewhere must find 
its way over to 𝑣, being split apart exponentially at each hop.  Moreover, the flow 
received will be limited as 𝑣 only has one incoming edge, as opposed to, ideally, several 
incoming edges for a node in the honest region.  Furthermore, since the flow is spread out 
exponentially, it prioritizes nodes in close range of the source node 𝑠, which intuitively 
should make nodes in 𝑠’s community more likely to be highly ranked.  This approach 
also prioritizes nodes in denser areas of the graph, as even though a node 𝑣 cannot take 
flow from all of its neighbors, such 𝑣 would likely still have a significant proportion of 
their edges coming from nodes at the next lower distance which they could receive flow 
from.  Since social graphs consist mostly of nodes split into dense communities, this 
would serve to benefit honest nodes.  
 
This algorithm, which we call the “DownhillFlow” algorithm (abbreviated DF), is shown 
below: 
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Algorithm 1: DF1(𝑠, 𝑑𝑠) 
1. 𝑡𝑠 ← 1 
2. 𝑡𝑣 ← 0⁡∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐺 ∖ {𝑠} 
3. 𝑄 ← {𝑠} 
4. while 𝑄 ≠ ∅ do: 
5.  Extract 𝑣 ← 𝑄. 
6.  for 𝑤 ∈ 𝑁(𝑣) ∶ 𝑑𝑠(𝑤) = 𝑑𝑠(𝑣) + 1 do: 
7.   if 𝑡𝑤 = 0 then Insert 𝑄 ← 𝑤. 
8.   𝑡𝑤 ← 𝑡𝑤 + 𝑡𝑣/deg⁡(𝑣) 
9. 𝑡𝑣 ← 𝑡𝑣/ deg(𝑣)⁡∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐺 
10. return 𝑡 
 
Essentially, the algorithm functions by running a breadth-first search starting from the 
source node 𝑠.  When a node 𝑣 is processed, it splits its flow evenly among its deg⁡(𝑣) 
neighbors 𝑤.  Then 𝑣 pushes the flow to 𝑤 if 𝑑𝑠(𝑤) > 𝑑𝑠(𝑣) and discards it otherwise.  
Note that since we have 𝑑𝑠(𝑤) > 𝑑𝑠(𝑣) with the edge 𝑣𝑤 ∈ 𝐸, we must necessarily have 
𝑑𝑠(𝑤) = 𝑑𝑠(𝑣) + 1. 
 
Some generalizations are made in the above algorithm for readability.  We use 𝑑𝑠 to 
indicate the distance vector of all nodes from 𝑠, which the algorithm takes as input.  In 
practice, however, this is unnecessary as the distance calculation can be streamlined in 
the BFS mechanism of the algorithm.  Also, as with many other Sybil defense protocols, 
the trust values are all normalized by dividing by degree.  Rather than reiterating through 
all of the nodes to do this, this step can be done inside of the while loop in steps 4~8 after 
each node pushes flow to its neighbors, as its trust value is not used again after this is 
done.  In section V, we will show that this degree-normalization improves the precision 
of the algorithm (and in fact turns out to be necessary for the algorithm to compute results 
that are significantly above random) and speculate on why this is the case. 
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Initial tests of this algorithm showed promising results; however, there is still room for 
improvement.  Namely, the edges 𝑣𝑤 such that 𝑑𝑠(𝑣) = 𝑑𝑠(𝑤) are entirely ignored by 
the algorithm, since an edge 𝑣𝑤 has flow pushed across it if and only if 𝑑𝑠(𝑣) =
𝑑𝑠(𝑤) + 1 or vice versa.  This seems to go against the goal of ranking nodes more highly 
that fall into denser areas of the graph. 
 
We can remedy this by adding an extra step to the algorithm wherein a node 𝑣 accepts 
flow from its same-level neighbors.  Note that care needs to be taken to ensure that the 
same-level push step is simultaneous, i.e. nodes do not mix up their same-level flow 
before pushing to other nodes at the same level.  We show how this is done here: 
Algorithm 2: DF2(𝑠, 𝑑𝑠) 
1. 𝑡𝑠, 𝑠𝑠 ← 1 
2. 𝑡𝑣, 𝑠𝑣 ← 0⁡∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐺 ∖ {𝑠} 
3. 𝑄 ← {𝑠} 
4. while 𝑄 ≠ ∅ do: 
5.  Extract 𝑣 ← 𝑄. 
6.  for 𝑤 ∈ 𝑁(𝑣) ∶ 𝑑𝑠(𝑤) = 𝑑𝑠(𝑣) do: 
7.   𝑠𝑣 ← 𝑡𝑤/deg⁡(𝑤) 
8.  for 𝑤 ∈ 𝑁(𝑣) ∶ 𝑑𝑠(𝑤) = 𝑑𝑠(𝑣) + 1 do: 
9.   if 𝑡𝑤 = 0 then Insert 𝑄 ← 𝑤. 
10.   𝑡𝑤 ← 𝑡𝑤 + (𝑡𝑣 + 𝑠𝑣)/deg⁡(𝑣) 
11. 𝑡𝑣 ← (𝑡𝑣 + 𝑠𝑣)/ deg(𝑣)⁡∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐺 
12. return 𝑡 
 
Each node 𝑣 keeps track of a separate value, 𝑠𝑣 for its trust obtained from flow pushed 
from same-level nodes, and this value is not added into its total trust 𝑡𝑣 until immediately 
before 𝑣 pushes its trust to its higher-level neighbors.  This serves to modify DF1 such 
that rather than ignoring same-level edges, they are instead utilized “both ways”: same-
level nodes 𝑢 and 𝑣 that share an edge 𝑢𝑣 will both push the flow they receive from 
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lower-level nodes to each other across that edge. 
 
This provides a slight improvement over DF1, but still suffers from the issue that flow 
can only be pushed through same-level edges at most once per BFS level, as each node 
pushes to its higher-level neighbors after receiving its same-level flow.  It is not clear if it 
is possible to efficiently work around this limitation with this approach – not only is the 
asymptotic running time of the algorithm affected if the number of same-level push steps 
is not bounded by a constant, it is not clear exactly how many same-level pushes is 
optimal. 
 
A different approach is to use a token system to determine where flow should be pushed 
instead of relying entirely on the distance from 𝑠: 
 
Algorithm 3: DF3(𝑠, 𝑑𝑠) 
1. 𝑡𝑠 ← 1 
2. 𝑡𝑣 ← 0⁡∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐺 ∖ {𝑠} 
3. 𝑇 ← 1 
4. 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 ← 𝑇 
5. 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑣 ← 0⁡∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐺 ∖ {𝑠} 
6. 𝑄 ← {𝑠} 
7. while 𝑄 ≠ ∅ do: 
8.  Extract 𝑣 ← 𝑄. 
9.  for 𝑤 ∈ 𝑁(𝑣) ∶ 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑤 = 0 or 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑤 > 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑣 do: 
10.   if 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑤 = 0 then: 
11.    𝑇 ← 𝑇 + 1 
12.    𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑤 ← 𝑇 
13.    Insert 𝑄 ← 𝑤. 
14.   𝑡𝑤 ← 𝑡𝑤 + 𝑡𝑣/deg⁡(𝑣) 
15. 𝑡𝑣 ← 𝑡𝑣/ deg(𝑣)⁡∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐺 
16. return 𝑡 
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In this version of the algorithm, each node 𝑣 has a unique token, 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑣, assigned to it.  
Here we start with 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 = 1 and each time a new node is seen, we increment the token 
value by 1 and assign it to that node.  However, the tokens need not be constrained except 
that they must be unique and for nodes 𝑣 and 𝑤 with 𝑑𝑠(𝑣) > 𝑑𝑠(𝑤), we must have 
𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑣 > 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑤.  DF3 accomplishes this since tokens are assigned only once, when we 
first see a node, and since it runs using BFS as a base, it processes all nodes in non-
decreasing order of distance, and thus there is no way to assign a node at a higher 
distance a token of lower value.  One caveat of this approach is that when we process a 
node 𝑣, we assign many tokens all at once to its neighbors⁡𝑤 ∈ 𝑁(𝑣), each of which must 
be unique.  Therefore, there must be some way of picking the order 𝑣’s neighbors are 
processed.  For our purposes, it suffices to pick them in random order. 
 
This approach is not perfect – it is possible that a node 𝑣 with several same-distance 
edges⁡𝑣𝑤 still will not receive flow from any of them, since we may have 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑤 >
𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑣 for every such 𝑤 ∈ 𝑁(𝑣).  However, in terms of the edges used, it is a significant 
improvement over the first version of the algorithm as here all edges are used in one 
direction or the other, and improves on DF2 in that it does allow for some, limited, 
capability for flow to be continually pushed across a BFS level. 
 
Initial tests showed better results for this version of the algorithm than both DF1 and 
DF2.  It is not obvious to us if there is a better method of incorporating the same-distance 
edges into our algorithm in a way that preserves the efficiency of the algorithm (as well 
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as some other relevant properties that we will discuss later).  As such, all results reported 
henceforth for the centralized setting will be for DF3. 
 
Note that all versions of the algorithm have time complexity 𝒪(|𝑉| + |𝐸|).  For DF1 and 
DF3, the while loop in steps 4 and 7 respectively processes each vertex at most once, and 
the for loop in steps 6/9 runs at most once in total for each edge of the graph.  For DF2, 
the while loop processes each vertex at most once, and the for loop processes same-level 
edges at most twice and all other edges at most once.  As the distance calculation and 
normalization by degree can both be streamlined within the while loop, neither of these 
steps add to the time complexity of the algorithm. 
 
c) Theoretical Guarantees and Relation to Random Walks 
We do not prove any theoretical guarantees of DownhillFlow in this thesis, instead 
aiming to show its effectiveness experimentally through comprehensive simulation.  We 
leave analysis of the theoretical guarantees of DownhillFlow to future work.  For our 
purposes, we do not believe this to be a problem, primarily for reasons discussed in I and 
II: without preprocessing, as with SybilGuard, it is very hard to define constraints that 
apply universally to all social graphs, and even traits widely assumed about social graphs 
in the literature, such as fast-mixing, do not appear to hold in practice [17, 19].  
Moreover, the “defense in depth” approach put forth by Alvisi [3] provides an argument 
that it is not too much of a disaster if one individual protocol fails to address all 
possibilities: theoretical weaknesses of one protocol can be made up for by additionally 
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using other protocols with orthogonal weaknesses.  For this reason, we believe that it is 
of utmost importance to demonstrate robustness in practice first and delve into theory 
later. 
 
It is worth noting that although DownhillFlow is designed to function as a flow 
algorithm, it turns out that the trust vector it computes can be modeled in terms of a 
specific type of random walk.  We show how this is done here: let 𝑠 ∈ 𝐻 be a source 
node, and let 𝑑 be the distance vector from 𝑠 to all nodes 𝑢 ∈ 𝐺.  At any given step of the 
walk, with 𝑣 being our current node, we pick a uniformly random 𝑤 ∈ 𝑁(𝑣).  Then we 
move to 𝑤 if and only if 𝑑𝑤 = 𝑑𝑣 + 1 and stop otherwise.  This walk, which we call a 
“downhill random walk”, shares similarity to the geometric-length random walks used by 
ACL, with a major difference: rather than having probability 𝛼 of the walk ending at all 
hops, the probability instead varies at each hop, according to the ratio of each 𝑣’s higher-
level neighbors to all its neighbors.  Since many of ACL’s community-detection 
guarantees stem from the use of its geometric-length random walks, we speculate based 
on this similarity that the distribution calculated by DownhillFlow effectively serves as a 
method of more loosely identifying a community of nodes surrounding 𝑣.  We leave 
further discussion to future work. 
 
IV – EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
a) Robustness Tests 
To measure the robustness of DownhillFlow’s results, we compare against the ACL 
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community detection algorithm, which is implemented as in [2].  We also compare 
against SybilGuard, as although it was the first widely cited protocol using the social 
graph structure as a foundation for Sybil defense, it is one of the few existing protocols 
that retains the quality of being distributed.  We aim to show that DownhillFlow obtains 
results better than those of SybilGuard, and only slightly worse than those of ACL. 
 
We use five graphs, which we selected from both Stanford Network Analysis Project [23] 
and Online Network Repository [22].  The graphs range in size from |𝑉|  26,000 to |𝑉| 
 300,000.  The graphs, along with various properties of them, are listed in Table 1: 
Graph |𝑉| |𝐸| 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑣𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Diam. 
epinions 26,588 100,120 7.53 443 17 
Twitter 81,306 1,768,149 33.01 3,383 7 
Slashdot 82,168 948,464 12.27 2,552 11 
LiveMocha 104,103 2,193,083 42.13 2,980 6 
DBLP 317,080 1,049,866 6.62 343 21 
Table 1: Number of nodes, number of edges, average and maximum degree, and 
diameter for the epinions, Twitter, Slashdot, LiveMocha, and DBLP graph datasets used 
in our study.  The datasets were obtained from [22, 23]. 
 
Our methodology closely resembles that of Alvisi et al. in [3].  We simulate Sybil attacks 
on the above five graphs under the two models of attack introduced in section Ib, and 
generate full trust rankings across all nodes in each graph.  For the random attack model, 
we test with with 𝑝 = 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.07, 0.09.  For the fixed attack model, we test two 
sets of parameters, intended to represent a weak attack (𝑔 ≈
1
100
|𝐸|) and a strong attack 
(𝑔 ≈
1
10
|𝐸|).  𝛾 is set according to |𝑉|: with the exception of epinions, we set 𝛾 = 25,000 
when |𝑉| < 100,000 and⁡𝛾 = 50,000 otherwise.  Because of its small size, we set 𝛾 = 
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5,000 for epinions. 
 
The parameters tested are listed in Table 2: 
Graph (𝑔, 𝛾), weak (𝑔, 𝛾), strong 
epinions (1,000, 5,000) (10,000, 5,000) 
Twitter (16,000, 25,000) (160,000, 25,000) 
Slashdot (10,000, 25,000) (100,000, 25,000) 
LiveMocha (20,000, 50,000) (200,000, 50,000) 
DBLP (10,000, 50,000) (100,000, 50,000) 
Table 2: Parameters for the fixed attack model.  Both weak and strong attacks are 
simulated.  The number of Sybil nodes 𝛾 remains the same for each graph, while the 
number of attack edges 𝑔 varies. 
 
To reduce the variance of our results, we test each iteration of the experiment from ten 
sources and take the average of the values we obtain.  We speculate in section VII on 
whether it may be possible to obtain better results by combining the values in other 
manners besides the average.  Since SybilGuard requires its input graphs to be 
preprocessed such that all nodes of degree fewer than 5 are iteratively removed, we 
perform that step as well when testing SybilGuard, but not with DownhillFlow or ACL.  
We also limit the source selection to nodes that do not fall within distance 2 of the Sybil 
region after the graph is attacked.  When this is impossible, we allow nodes that fall 
within distance 2, but not within distance 1 (i.e. nodes adjacent to the Sybil region) – this 
is sufficient to cover all cases. 
 
We configure ACL to have 𝛼 = 10-3 and 𝜖 = 10-6 for epinions, 𝜖 = 10-7 for all other 
graphs.  These settings are identical to the ones proposed by Alvisi et al. in [3].  
Throughout all tests henceforth, the value of 𝛼 is fixed, and we investigate only 
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variations to the value of⁡𝜖.  Some additional care needs to be taken to compute the trust 
ranking in the case of SybilGuard.  While DownhillFlow and ACL naturally compute a 
trust vector 𝑡 across all nodes in the graph, SybilGuard functions differently: it’s a 
protocol designed such that a honest source 𝑠 can choose to accept or reject any other 
single node in the graph 𝑣.  Thus, for our experiment, we set 𝑡𝑣 to be the number of⁡𝑠’s 
random routes that accept 𝑣.  Note that because the graphs in SybilGuard are 
preprocessed, deg(𝑠) ≥ 5, and since⁡𝑠 originates a random route from each edge incident 
to it, one source 𝑠 will always have at least 5 random routes.  Also note that in 
SybilGuard, a node 𝑣 is accepted if at least 
deg(𝑠)
2
 of 𝑠’s routes accept 𝑣, so we have 
essentially eliminated this check and used the count of accepted routes directly.  We also 
need to set the length of the random routes 𝑙.  Yu et al. [29] recommend a route length of 
𝑙 = Θ(√𝑛 log(𝑛)), but this bound is asymptotic and we must set the hidden constant.  We 
determined this by manually testing several such constants and using the one for which 
SybilGuard generated the best results. This was 1/40 for epinions and 1/100 for other 
graphs. 
 
Table 3 shows the effects of preprocessing the graphs for SybilGuard and the exact route 
lengths used for random attack, 𝑝 = 0.01: 
 
b) Running Time Tests 
We analyze the running time of DownhillFlow by comparing it to that of ACL.  
DownhillFlow has an asymptotic running time of 𝒪(|𝑉| + |𝐸|) and takes no parameters, 
 25 
 |𝑉|, 
original 
|𝑉|, pre-
processed 
% 
removed 
 
𝑙 
epinions 26,588 5,904 77.79% 15 
Twitter 81,306 62,516 23.11% 27 
Slashdot 82,168 26,752 67.44% 16 
LiveMocha 104,103 79,811 23.33% 31 
DBLP 317,080 98,942 68.79% 36 
Table 3: Information for our graphs related to SybilGuard.  The original number of 
nodes, number of nodes remaining after preprocessing, and % removed are shown along 
with the route length 𝑙. 
 
so we can simply measure its running time.  However, ACL’s situation is more 
complicated: its running time is 𝒪(
1
𝛼𝜖
), inversely proportional to the jumpback parameter 
𝛼 and error parameter 𝜖.  This means that its running time is determined by the desired 
accuracy of its results: increasing 𝜖 gives less precise results, but makes the algorithm 
finish more quickly.  In fact, increasing 𝜖 too much means that some nodes 𝑣 aren’t even 
recognized by ACL – that is, they have 𝑡𝑣 = 0.  Of course, if 𝑡𝑣 = 0, 𝑣 can’t possibly be 
distinguished from any Sybil node.  So, we must not only measure the precision of 
ACL’s results, but the fraction of nodes for which ACL actually obtains results.  We say 
that ACL “captures” a node 𝑣 for a certain 𝜖 if it returns 𝑡𝑣 > 0 for that 𝜖. 
 
Another point about ACL’s running time is that it is entirely independent of the size of 
the graph, depending on only the jumpback and error parameters 𝛼 and 𝜖.  In theory, this 
would mean that as the graph size tends to infinity, ACL’s running time would be less 
than that of DF.  It is not so clear, however, if and where the 𝒪(|𝑉| + |𝐸|) bound 
overtakes the 𝒪(
1
𝛼𝜖
) bound on social graphs in use today.  It is also not clear the impact of 
graph size on the value of 𝜖 necessary to capture the entire honest region. 
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To give insight into both of these problems, we run DownhillFlow and ACL on epinions 
and DBLP, the two extremes amongst the graphs we use in testing in terms of |𝑉|, under 
the random attack from ten sources and measure the running time across each run.  We 
assume a qualitative worst-case scenario for purposes of DownhillFlow’s results: 𝑝 is set 
to the largest possible value where DownhillFlow is capable of distinguishing a large 
portion of the graph (for our purposes, we require at least 90% precision at 50% recall).  
For epinions, 𝑝 = 0.1; for DBLP, 𝑝 = 0.03.  For ACL, we vary 𝜖 across a range of values.  
We start at the 𝜖 value used in the experiments in i (for which ACL captures the entire 
graph), and increase the value logarithmically until ACL’s running time becomes lower 
than that of DF.  For each run of ACL, we measure its running time, its percentage of 
honest nodes captured 𝐻𝐶𝜖 and its precision over the nonzero portion of the trust ranking 
– in other words, at 𝐻𝐶𝜖 recall.  Then we compare its precision with that of DF at recall 
𝐻𝐶𝜖 for that run.  We report on how the two algorithms compare to each other when 𝜖 is 
raised enough to make ACL match DF’s running time.  From there, we extrapolate on 
what would happen on larger graphs. 
 
c) Obtaining Multiple Sources from One Honest 𝑠  
One pitfall of using only a single source node 𝑠 is that it may not be able to effectively 
distinguish nodes outside of its community from nodes in the Sybil region, thanks to the 
fact that the communities are also separated by sparse cuts.  As such, we look into 
possibilities for a source node 𝑠 to pick multiple other sources in a way where 1) they are 
all likely to be honest, and 2) combining the results of these sources gives results more 
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robust than those generated from 𝑠 alone.  Ideally, by utilizing this type of approach, the 
source node 𝑠 could leverage the community sub-structure of the social graph to pick 
other honest sources throughout the graph’s various communities, correctly scoring a 
wider range of honest nodes highly in the ranking.  This idea is not new – algorithms 
such as Gatekeeper [24] have similar source distribution mechanisms in place, and Cao et 
al. [10] report about using manual verification to distribute their sources – but the 
technical workings of such mechanisms vary from algorithm to algorithm.  Therefore, we 
wish to isolate ideas that work well specifically for DownhillFlow. 
 
We investigate the following methods for a source node 𝑠 (chosen randomly from the 
honest region, under the constraint that 𝑠 is not within distance 2 of the Sybil region) to 
determine multiple other, trusted sources: 
 Top 10 positions of the trust ranking 𝑡. 
 Top 10 positions of the trust ranking 𝑡, subject to the condition that the nodes are 
spread out across different distances.  In this case, we force the nodes to be 
distributed as uniformly as possible from distances 1 to 5. 
 Top 10 positions of the trust ranking 𝑡 such that all nodes are of distance 𝑑 or 
greater from 𝑠.  We test 𝑑 = 4, 5. 
 Top 10 positions of the trust ranking 𝑡 such that all nodes are of distance 𝑑 or 
greater from each other.  We test 𝑑 = 4, 5. 
 Ten random nodes from the top 𝑘 percent of the trust ranking 𝑡, chosen uniformly.  
We test 𝑘 = 1%, 10%.  
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We also measure the following for comparison purposes: 
 Ten randomly determined honest nodes. 
 One node running ACL. 
These tests were all ran on the epinions graph under a random attack with 𝑝 = 0.1.  The 
value of 𝜖 used for ACL was set to 10-6, as with the experiments in IVa. 
 
V – RESULTS 
a) Robustness 
Figure 1 shows the precision-recall curves for DownhillFlow on all five graphs under the 
random attack model.  On all graphs but DBLP, DownhillFlow generates good results 
even at 𝑝 = 0.09.  Table 4 gives the exact precision values for DownhillFlow on epinions 
at 50%, 90%, and 95% recall.  We also report the corresponding results for ACL in 
Figure 2 and Table 5, respectively.  The results obtained for ACL are consistent with 
those obtained by Alvisi in [3].  At 95% recall, ACL continues to identify honest nodes 
with high precision even under stronger attacks. 
 
Figure 3 shows precision-recall curves comparing DownhillFlow’s results with those 
obtained by ACL and SybilGuard on epinions and DBLP at 𝑝 = 0.01, 0.05.  We obtained 
similar results in all other iterations of the experiment, with exception of the strong fixed 
attack.  In all cases but that case, for all graphs, ACL’s results are more robust than those 
of DownhillFlow, which in turn are more robust than those of SybilGuard.  Recall that 
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Figure 1: Precision-recall curves for DownhillFlow on epinions (top left), Twitter (top 
right), Slashdot (middle left), LiveMocha (middle right), and DBLP (bottom) graphs. 
 
 50% 90% 95% 
𝑝 = 0.01 0.996 0.987 0.980 
𝑝 = 0.03 0.979 0.952 0.919 
𝑝 = 0.05 0.962 0.887 0.801 
𝑝 = 0.07 0.955 0.888 0.806 
𝑝 = 0.09 0.929 0.811 0.684 
Table 4: Precision of DownhillFlow on epinions by attack strength under the random 
attack model at 50%, 90% and 95% recall.  A value of 0.5 corresponds to a random 
ranking. 
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Figure 2: Precision-recall curves for ACL on epinions (top left), Twitter (top right), 
Slashdot (middle left), LiveMocha (middle right), and DBLP (bottom) graphs. 
 
 50% 90% 95% 
𝑝 = 0.01 1.000 1.000 1.000 
𝑝 = 0.03 0.998 0.998 0.998 
𝑝 = 0.05 0.992 0.989 0.983 
𝑝 = 0.07 0.991 0.986 0.968 
𝑝 = 0.09 0.971 0.961 0.922 
 
Table 5: Precision of ACL on epinions by attack strength under the random attack model 
at 50%, 90% and 95% recall.  A value of 0.5 corresponds to a random ranking. 
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Figure 3: Precision-recall curves comparing ACL, DownhillFlow and SybilGuard.  The 
tests shown are epinions (left) and DBLP (right) at 𝑝 = 0.01 (top) and 𝑝 = 0.05 (bottom).  
SybilGuard degrades much more quickly than DownhillFlow under stronger attacks. 
 
for SybilGuard, we report results on the preprocessed input graphs, compared to the raw 
input graphs for DownhillFlow and ACL.  Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, under 
the strong fixed attack, SybilGuard overtakes both DownhillFlow and ACL on the twitter 
and DBLP graphs.  The results for LiveMocha are also mixed, as SybilGuard stays 
slightly ahead of ACL for most of the trust ranking, but its precision decreases rapidly at 
around 60% recall.  DownhillFlow and ACL’s results continue to remain mostly 
correlated – whichever one is better varies depending on the graph.  However, it must 
also be noted that under many of the strong fixed attacks, almost no trust rankings were 
noticeably above random, except on LiveMocha.  Also note that the fixed attack model 
was the model SybilGuard was originally studied under in [29]. 
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The preprocessing step for SybilGuard proved to be problematic in several iterations of 
the experiment: we found that for strong enough attacks, it was impossible to find ten 
source nodes not within distance 2 of the Sybil region after preprocessing.  This did not 
happen with any of the raw input graphs, and as such DownhillFlow and ACL did not 
suffer from this problem.  Note that even when suitable source nodes were possible to 
pick after SybilGuard’s preprocessing step, which was the case in all iterations for both 
epinions and DBLP as well as all iterations for which 𝑝 = 0.01, DownhillFlow’s results 
were still more robust than those of SybilGuard in all iterations besides the strong fixed 
attacks.  Additionally, the results for SybilGuard on other graphs besides epinions and 
DBLP were qualitatively very similar to those for epinions on DBLP under all attack 
strengths, usually being satisfactory until⁡𝑝 = 0.03 but experiencing a sharp drop at the 𝑝 
= 0.05 level regardless of how the distance was constricted.  While the values we 
obtained in section IV support the result of Mohaisen et al. in [19], this result seems to 
provide an argument that not only does preprocessing rule out nodes, it can actually serve 
to endanger the nodes that do remain in the graph after the preprocessing step is finished.  
 
For a full collection of precision-recall curves for all iterations of the experiment (taking 
graph, attack type/strength and protocol as parameters), consult Appendix A.  Both 
graphs comparing by values of 𝑝 and graphs comparing by protocol are included there. 
 
b) Running Time 
Table 6 shows the average running time across the ten source nodes for DownhillFlow 
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and ACL on epinions and DBLP, respectively.   
 epinions DBLP 
DF 0.099 s 1.263 s 
ACL, 1.0*10
-7 
--- 45.6 min + 
ACL, 2.0*10
-7
 --- 9.5 min + 
ACL, 4.5*10
-7
 --- 17.313 s 
ACL, 1.0*10
-6
 4.4 min + 4.397 s 
ACL, 2.0*10
-6
 54.165 s + 1.920 s 
ACL, 4.5*10
-6
 0.405 s 1.585 s * 
ACL, 1.0*10
-5
 0.099 s * 0.742 s * 
Table 6: Running time of DownhillFlow vs. ACL on epinions and DBLP graphs 
(average, 10 runs).  The speed/𝜖 tradeoff is shown for ACL and compared to 
DownhillFlow (no parameters), starting at the value used in a).  Values marked with + 
show ACL captures all honest nodes, i.e. 𝑡𝑣 > 0 ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐻.  Values marked with * begin 
from the highest 𝜖 where ACL’s running time is slower. 
 
For DownhillFlow, the running time in our implementation cleanly follows its asymptotic 
bound: |𝑉| + |𝐸| is slightly over 10 times larger for DBLP (1,366,946) than epinions 
(126,708).  When ACL captures the entire honest region, its running time also cleanly 
follows its asymptotic bound.  The running times for DBLP are approximately ten times 
those of epinions, while the value of 𝜖 was reduced by a factor of 1/10.  When the 𝜖 value 
is set high enough for ACL to start missing nodes, however, the running time improves at 
a rapid rate, faster than its asymptotic bound would suggest.  Eventually, increasing 𝜖 
enough allows ACL’s running time performance to overtake that of DownhillFlow. 
 
So what happens to ACL’s results at that point?  As Table 6 shows, on both graphs ACL 
does not match DownhillFlow’s speed until well after it begins to miss nodes.  We 
examine ACL’s behavior on both graphs individually.  Table 7 shows more detailed 
information for the epinions graph, including the percentage 𝐻𝐶𝜖 of the honest region 
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captured and precision at 𝐻𝐶𝜖 recall: 
 
 epinions # 𝑣 ∈ 𝐻 
missed 
𝐻𝐶𝜖 ACL prec. 
at 𝐻𝐶𝜖 recall 
DF prec. at 
𝐻𝐶𝜖 recall 
DF 0.099 s --- --- --- --- 
ACL, 1.0*10
-6
 4.4 min + 0 + 100.00% + --- --- 
ACL, 2.0*10
-6
 54.165 s + 0 + 100.00% + --- --- 
ACL, 4.5*10
-6
 0.405 s 926 96.51% 0.648 0.581 
ACL, 1.0*10
-5
 0.099 s * 8,058 * 69.69% * 0.759 * 0.874 * 
Table 7: Running time of DownhillFlow versus ACL on epinions, including the 𝐻𝐶𝜖 
obtained by ACL under various 𝜖 values.  The two rightmost columns compare 
DownhillFlow’s precision versus that of ACL among the % of the trust ranking 
recognized by ACL, 𝑝 = 0.1. 
 
 
Figure 4: Precision-recall curve of DownhillFlow compared to ACL on epinions ran at 𝜖 
= 10
-5
, 𝑝 = 0.1.  At 69.69% recall, ACL’s curve begins to drop linearly as its results 
correspond to random. 
 
This seems to indicate a mix of results: DownhillFlow enjoys a significant precision 
advantage compared to ACL at 𝜖 = 10-5 among the nonzero portion of ACL’s trust 
ranking, but at the next lower 𝜖 level, this advantage is lost. 
 
Next we focus on DBLP.  Table 8 shows detailed information for the DBLP graph.  On 
DBLP, ACL’s decrease in ability to capture honest nodes is more noticeable.  At the 
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point where ACL matches DownhillFlow, ACL only captures 31.10% of the honest 
region; even at the next lower 𝜖 level, we have only 𝐻𝐶2.0∗10−6 = 56.66%, while 
DownhillFlow still obtains slightly better precision.  This seems to indicate that 
 DBLP # 𝑣 ∈ 𝐻 
missed 
𝐻𝐶𝜖 ACL prec. at 
𝐻𝐶𝜖 recall 
DF prec. at 
𝐻𝐶𝜖 recall 
DF 1.263 s --- --- --- --- 
ACL, 1.0*10
-7 
45.6 min + 0 + 100.00% + --- --- 
ACL, 2.0*10
-7
 9.5 min + 0 + 100.00% + --- --- 
ACL, 4.5*10
-7
 17.313 s 10,156 96.79% 0.580 0.516 
ACL, 1.0*10
-6
 4.397 s 60,590 80.89% 0.690 0.637 
ACL, 2.0*10
-6
 1.920 s 137,410 56.66% 0.757 0.775 
ACL, 4.5*10
-6
 1.585 s * 218,443 * 31.10% * 0.798 * 0.832 * 
ACL, 1.0*10
-5
 0.742 s * 266,348 * 15.99% * 0.828 * 0.845 * 
Table 8: Running time of DownhillFlow versus ACL on DBLP, including the 𝐻𝐶𝜖 
obtained by ACL under various 𝜖 values.  The two rightmost columns compare 
DownhillFlow’s precision versus that of ACL among the % of the trust ranking 
recognized by ACL, 𝑝 = 0.03. 
 
 
Figure 5: Precision-recall curve of DownhillFlow compared to ACL on DBLP ran at 𝜖 = 
4.5 *10
-6
, 2.0 * 10
-6
, 𝑝 = 0.03. 
 
DownhillFlow’s advantage is greater on larger graphs, as the larger the graph, the smaller 
𝜖 required for ACL to capture the complete honest region. 
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It is worth noting that it is not necessarily a bad thing if ACL fails to capture 100% of the 
honest nodes – on both graphs, a proper choice of 𝜖 (4.5 * 10-6 for epinions and 4.5 * 10-5 
for DBLP) allows ACL to capture a significant majority of the honest region (>96% in 
both cases), while still incurring the rapid decrease in running time that occurs when 
ACL does not capture the whole graph.  While it was previously known (and in fact a 
part of ACL’s design) that higher values of 𝜖 resulted in faster running time and some 
nodes 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 having 𝑡𝑣 = 0, to our knowledge, we are the first to report actual running 
times showing that ACL can capture a large portion of the honest subgraph while still 
being fast. 
 
That being said, we next revisit our assumption of a worst-case scenario for 
DownhillFlow and ask: is DownhillFlow’s advantage more significant under a weak 
attack?  And if so, how much greater of a proportion of nodes can DownhillFlow rank 
precisely than is capturable by ACL?  Table 9 and Figure 6 show the percentage of nodes 
recalled by DownhillFlow at 99.00% and 98.00% precision and the precision-recall 
curves for DownhillFlow and ACL, respectively, under a very weak attack (𝑝 = 0.001).  
For ACL, we report the values for 𝜖 = 2.0 * 10-6 and 4.5 * 10-6: 
Value % nodes 
DF, 0.990 prec. 84.16% 
DF, 0.980 prec. 92.53% 
ACL, 𝐻𝐶2.0∗10−6 59.85% 
ACL, 𝐻𝐶4.5∗10−6 34.69% 
Table 9: Comparing the percentage of nodes DownhillFlow can recall at precision 99%, 
98% versus the percentage of nodes captured by ACL at 𝜖 = 2.0 * 10-6, 4.5 * 10-6, 𝑝 = 
0.001.  Note that these 𝐻𝐶𝜖 values are higher than those for 𝑝 = 0.03 since there are fewer 
attack edges. 
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Although we have assumed an unreasonably weak attack, these findings seem to confirm 
our intuition: when the attack strength is weak enough, DownhillFlow can recall a far 
greater proportion of the graph at good precision than ACL can capture (at any 
precision).  We have yet to investigate how this effect downscales as the attack strength 
increases upward back to 𝑝 = 0.01~0.03. 
 
Figure 6: Precision-recall curve for DownhillFlow versus ACL at 𝜖 = 2.0 * 10-6, 4.5 * 
10
-6
 for 𝑝 = 0.001. 
 
c) Obtaining Multiple Sources from One Honest 𝑠 
Figure 7 shows the precision-recall curves for the different methods of obtaining multiple 
sources from one honest 𝑠. 
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Figure 7: Precision-recall curves comparing various ways of choosing multiple sources 
from a trust ranking.  For comparison, we show the results for one source, ten random 
sources and one node running ACL on all graphs.  The remaining curves are as follows.  
Top-left: Top 10 (top ten nodes) and top 10 different 𝑑 (top-ranked nodes at different 
distances spread uniformly 1 < 𝑑𝑠(𝑣) < 5); Top-right: 𝑑4 and 𝑑5 (top-ranked nodes at 
distances 4, 5 respectively); Bottom-left: 𝑑4ALL and 𝑑5ALL (top-ranked nodes all 
distances 4, 5 from each other respectively); Bottom-right: 1% and 10% (ten random 
nodes from the top 1% and 10% of the trust ranking respectively). 
 
The results range from moderately better than with one 𝑠 (but still slightly worse than 
random) to noticeably worse.  Particularly, selecting the top 10 nodes from the trust 
ranking and picking 10 nodes randomly from the highest 𝑘% of the ranking fared worse 
off than one node.  In the former case, we speculate this is because picking the top 10 
nodes with no further processing usually just results in a group of nodes clustered around 
𝑠.  In the latter case, we speculate that due to its randomness, the approach is too 
susceptible to accepting either 1) “bad” sources that are close or adjacent to the Sybil 
region, or 2) Sybil nodes themselves. 
 
The most robust results were obtained by selecting nodes from the top of the trust ranking 
in a way where they had to be distance at least 𝑑 from each other; this approach both with 
𝑑 = 4, 5 outranked the other approaches.  We suspect that out of the approaches we tried, 
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this approach is the most effective at spreading the source nodes throughout the entire 
graph, and thus being more likely to place source nodes within different communities. 
 
d) Results Without Degree Normalization 
We also tested how DownhillFlow performs without the degree-normalization step at the 
end as it was not immediately obvious how this step is beneficial to the algorithm.  Figure 
8 shows the precision-recall curves for DownhillFlow on epinions, without the degree-
normalization step.  Skipping over the degree-normalization step makes the resulting trust 
list worse by a significant margin: 
 
Figure 8: Precision-recall curve for DownhillFlow on epinions without degree-
normalization (left).  For comparison, the original curve is shown (right). 
 
The reason many random walk distribution-based protocols (such as SybilRank [10] and 
ACL [3]) normalize by degree is because the stationary distribution 𝜋 is not a uniform 
distribution: it is proportional to the degree of the nodes.  Thus normalizing by degree 
eliminates the bias nodes would otherwise receive by having high degree.  Since degree 
normalization helps the robustness of our algorithm, we would thus expect this bias to be 
present in the non-normalized results: a manual inspection of the trust ranking produced 
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at 𝑝 = 0.09 confirms this is the case, with higher-degree nodes being concentrated near 
the top of the ranking and all Sybils within the top 500 positions of the ranking having 
deg⁡(𝑣) > 12 (and most having deg⁡(𝑣) > 30).  We thus speculate that although our 
algorithm is based around flow, we can still draw connections to random walk theory 
when investigating its properties, as with the approach discussed in IIIc. 
 
 
 
VI – DISTRIBUTED SETTING 
We have shown that in the centralized setting, the results obtained by DownhillFlow are a 
significant improvement over those obtained by SybilGuard.  We have also shown that 
for the results it achieves, DownhillFlow has excellent running time performance, and 
that its results overtake those of ACL when ACL’s error parameter 𝜖 is pushed such that 
ACL’s speed matches that of DownhillFlow.  However, we are still missing one piece of 
the puzzle: namely, showing how to adapt DownhillFlow to the distributed setting.  To 
get a suitable distributed protocol, we need 1) the source node 𝑠 to be able to get its trust 
vector 𝑡 without knowledge of the full graph topology, and 2) all nodes 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 to have 
only 𝒪(|𝑉|) space to work with.  The centralized version of the algorithm makes use of 
the fact that the entity running the algorithm knows (and stores in memory) the full 
topology of the graph.  Therefore, we need a different approach in order to meet these 
two assumptions.  In this section, we discuss possible approaches to this by drawing on 
results from two other cryptographic fields: accumulators and e-cash. 
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We first introduce the notion of a cryptographic accumulator.  Cryptographic 
accumulator schemes were first proposed in [7], and allow for a set of input values 𝒳 
over an input domain 𝒵𝑖 to be combined, or “accumulated”, into a single value 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝒳 ∈
𝒵𝑎, such that the original set 𝒳 cannot be forged or tampered with.  This is done using 
witnesses: for each 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝒳, we can compute a witness 𝑤𝑥𝑖, which a verification algorithm 
can use to verify 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝒳.  It must be computationally infeasible to compute a witness 𝑤𝑥𝑖 
for a value 𝑥𝑖 ∉ 𝒳.  We provide a simplified definition, taken from [12], which we urge 
the reader to consult for a more detailed discussion about the properties enjoyed by such 
schemes and the various accumulator schemes in use today: 
 
Definition 2 (Cryptographic accumulator): A static cryptographic accumulator scheme 
is a 4-tuple of efficient algorithms  (Gen, Eval, WitCreate, Verify) which are defined as 
follows: 
1. Gen(1𝑘, 𝑡): Takes as input 𝑘, a security parameter, and 𝑡, the maximum size of 
the set 𝒳 supported by the accumulator scheme.  If there is no upper bound on the 
size of 𝒳, then 𝑡 = ∞.  Returns the private/public accumulator key pair 
(𝑆𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐 , 𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐). 
2. Eval((𝑆𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐
~ , 𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐),𝒳): Takes as input (optional) 𝑆𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐,⁡𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐 and the set⁡𝒳 of 
values to be accumulated and returns the accumulated value 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝒳. 
3. WitCreate((𝑆𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐
~ , 𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐), 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝒳 , 𝑥𝑖): Takes as input (optional) 𝑆𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐,⁡𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐 an 
accumulated value⁡𝑎𝑐𝑐𝒳 and a value 𝑥𝑖.  Computes and returns a witness 𝑤𝑥𝑖 if 
𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝒳 and returns false otherwise. 
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4. Verify(𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐 , 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝒳 , 𝑤𝑥𝑖,⁡𝑥𝑖): Takes as input ⁡𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐, an accumulated value⁡𝑎𝑐𝑐𝒳, 
a witness 𝑤𝑥𝑖 and a value 𝑥𝑖.  Returns true if 𝑤𝑥𝑖 is a witness proving 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝒳 and 
false otherwise. 
 
𝑆𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐
~  is used in the above definition to indicate that the secret key passed as input is 
optional; henceforth, when an algorithm is called without the secret key, we denote this 
by using ∅ in its place.  Note that the definition provided above is for a static 
accumulator scheme.  This differs from a dynamic accumulator scheme in that 
essentially, the set 𝒳 is fixed in place when the Eval algorithm is called.  In a dynamic 
scheme, additional algorithms are provided to allow for addition and deletion of elements 
to 𝒳 and to update the witnesses 𝑤𝑥𝑖 when a value 𝑥𝑗 ≠ 𝑥𝑖 is added to or deleted from 𝒳.  
We focus on the static setting here as dynamic schemes are harder to construct and we do 
not need the added functionality they provide.  Note also that we do not instantiate any 
cryptographic accumulator schemes in this thesis.  We do, however, assume the existence 
of a black-box static, unbounded accumulator scheme over an input domain 𝒵𝑖 such that 
there exists a hash function ℋ:⁡𝒯 → 𝒵𝑖 accepting a set of flow tickets 𝒯, which we define 
shortly, as its domain.  
 
We can apply accumulators to DownhillFlow by taking advantage of the fact that to 
know where a node 𝑣 should push flow, we need only look at the nodes 𝑤 ∈ 𝑁(𝑣) and 
their corresponding 𝑑𝑠(𝑤)s.  Each 𝑣 makes use of several flow tickets, denoted 〈𝑣, 𝑤〉, 
indicating it is to push flow to a target node 𝑤.  Then each⁡𝑣 forms a set 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣 of all 
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tickets going in and out from itself.  We can then store the entire set 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣 using one 
value 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑣.  𝑣 forwards this information to 𝑠 by composing another set, 𝑉𝐸𝑅, of (ticket, 
witness) pairs the witness of which indicates that the ticket 〈𝑖, 𝑗〉 is a part of the value 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖.  Note we have either 𝑖 or 𝑗 = 𝑣.  𝑠 can use the witnesses from the 𝑉𝐸𝑅 set to verify 
that the tickets it receives are legitimate, and thus can update 𝑣’s trust accordingly.  𝑠 
maintains a hash table ℳ linking nodes to (trust value,⁡𝑎𝑐𝑐, |𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇|) tuples, and thanks to 
the space-saving property accumulators provide, this all takes only 𝒪(|𝑉|) space.   Note 
also that 𝑠 must instantiate its own 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇 and 𝑎𝑐𝑐 values and propagate its own tickets for 
use by its neighbors. 
 
Before proceeding further, we must note a contingency.  First, degree-normalization here 
does not function the same way as with the centralized version of the algorithm: 𝑠 stores 
the base 𝑡𝑣 and subsequently calculates the final trust value by dividing by |𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣| as 
opposed to deg⁡(𝑣).  It is possible to mitigate this by requiring nodes to keep track of 
empty tickets for their neighbors at the same level.  However, we then run into a different 
problem: the adversary has full control over the Sybil region 𝑆 and can thus arrange it 
such that 𝑆 has no nodes at the same BFS level with each other, making |𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣| =
deg(𝑣)⁡∀𝑣 ∈ 𝑆!  We thus conclude that it is sufficient to use |𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣| for all nodes 
(which can only increase the trust). 
 
The protocol is shown below in algorithms 4.1 (for a source node 𝑠) and 4.2 (for a non-
source node 𝑣): 
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Algorithm 4.1: DF1_DIST (source node 𝑠) 
 // Initialization 
1 ℳ ← ∅ 
2 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇 ← ∅ 
 // Compute entry for⁡𝑠 and push first round of tickets 
3 for each higher-level node 𝑣 do: 
4  𝑇𝑣 ← 〈𝑠, 𝑣〉 
5  𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇 ← 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇 ∪ {ℋ(𝑇𝑣)} 
6 𝑎𝑐𝑐 ← Eval((𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐, ∅), 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇) 
7 for each higher-level node 𝑣 do: 
8  send 〈𝑇𝑣, 𝑎𝑐𝑐〉 to 𝑣 
 // Register entry for 𝑠 in the hash table ℳ 
9 ℳ.add(𝑠, (1, 𝑎𝑐𝑐, |𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇|)) 
 // Receive 𝑉𝐸𝑅 messages from the rest of the graph 
10 for each 〈𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑣〉 from 𝑣 ≠ 𝑠 do: 
  // Initialize info for 𝑣 
11  𝑡𝑣 ← 0 
12  𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣 ← ∅ 
  // Add flow for each incoming ticket that is verified 
13  for each (𝑇 ∶= 〈𝑖, 𝑗〉, 𝑤) ∈ 𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑣 do: 
14   if 𝑗 = 𝑣 and Verify(𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐 , 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖, 𝑤, 𝑇) = true then 𝑡𝑣 ← 𝑡𝑣 +
𝑡𝑖
|𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑖|
 
15   𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣 ← 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣 ∪ {ℋ(𝑇)} 
  // Compute 𝑣’s 𝑎𝑐𝑐 value and store entry for 𝑣 in ℳ 
16  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑣 ← Eval((𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐 , ∅), 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣) 
17  ℳ.add(𝑣, (𝑡𝑣, 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑣, |𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇|𝑣)) 
 // Repeat step 10 until a suitable amount of nodes are accepted.  𝑠 may terminate the 
 // protocol at its own discretion. 
 
This approach carries a variety of limitations, which we proceed to discuss.  The first is 
that even though the protocol is executed in a distributed manner, the flow computation is 
all done locally at 𝑠 (albeit requiring only 𝒪(|𝑉|) space).  This is not suitable for a 
distributed protocol: it would be more intuitive if the computation required to calculate 
the flow could be distributed throughout the graph as well, in a way where nodes have a 
proof of work which could be sent back to 𝑠.   
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Algorithm 4.2: DF1_DIST (non-source node 𝑣) 
 // Initialization 
1 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇 ← ∅ 
2 𝑉𝐸𝑅 ← ∅ 
 // Receive tickets from lower-level nodes 
3 for each 〈𝑇𝑢 ∶= 〈𝑢, 𝑣〉, 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢〉 from lower-level nodes 𝑢 do: 
4  𝑤𝑢 = WitCreate((𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐 , ∅), 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢,ℋ(𝑇𝑢)) 
5  𝑉𝐸𝑅 ← 𝑉𝐸𝑅 ∪ {(𝑇𝑢, 𝑤𝑢)}  
6  𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇 ← 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇 ∪ {ℋ(𝑇𝑢)} 
 // Compute 𝑎𝑐𝑐, push info to higher-level nodes and to 𝑠 
7 for each higher-level node 𝑤 do: 
8  𝑇𝑤 ← 〈𝑣, 𝑤〉 
9  𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇 ← 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇 ∪ {ℋ(𝑇𝑤)} 
10 𝑎𝑐𝑐 ← Eval((𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐, ∅), 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇) 
11 for each higher-level node 𝑤 do: 
12  send 〈𝑇𝑤 , 𝑎𝑐𝑐〉 to 𝑤 
13 send 〈𝑉𝐸𝑅, 𝑎𝑐𝑐〉 to 𝑠 
 // End 
 
Another limitation stems from the algorithm’s complexity at 𝑠.  The for loop in step 10 is 
ran at most 𝒪(|𝑉|) times.  The for loop in step 13 is at most 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 times, however it is 
only ran in total at most twice in for each edge in the graph.  In step 14, 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢 is obtained 
from the hash table ℳ, which is 𝒪(1) average-case complexity (but⁡𝒪(|𝑉|) worst-case).  
In step 14, the Verify algorithm is called, and step 15 is constant, so assuming constant-
time witness verification, as in for instance [20], these loops contribute 𝒪(|𝑉| + |𝐸|) total 
average complexity.  However, step 16 calls the Eval algorithm, and as such, its time 
complexity at that step is determined by the time complexity of the Eval algorithm.  
Further, it takes 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣 as input, which is 𝒪(|𝑉|) size worst-case.  However, as shown in 
section IV, this is not indicative of the average-case complexity: |𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑣| is tightly 
bounded by 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥, which for many social graphs ≪ |𝑉|.  Since the Eval algorithm 
must be efficient, this contributes 𝒪(|𝑉|𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
2) average complexity, which is the 
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dominating factor. 
 
A third limitation is that the protocol assumes each 𝑣 is aware of which of its neighbors 
are lower-level vs. higher-level (or same-level).  This is in part based upon the result of 
Bazzi et al. [5], which presents a secure distance-vector routing protocol wherein Sybil 
nodes generally may not report a lower distance to 𝑠 than their actual distance.  However, 
that protocol carries a few corner cases where this condition does not hold: for instance, 
Sybil nodes 𝑣 can report a lower distance if there exists a closer 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆.  It is not clear to 
us how to circumvent this. 
  
We next investigate solutions to the above limitations by noting that the requirement that 
Sybil nodes may not create arbitrary flow shares strong similarity with the security 
requirement of electronic cash.  Electronic cash was originally designed by Chaum [9] as 
a system for electronic payments, and the many schemes in the literature since share a 
variety of properties.  We give an informal description of these properties below, 
modeled after the categorization of Okamoto et al. [21]: 
1. Privacy – Users cannot be identified by their purchases. 
2. Security – Users cannot forge or double-spend coins. 
3. Offlineness – Users can make purchases directly to merchants without consulting 
with the bank. 
4. Transferability – Users can transfer their coins to other users. 
5. Divisibility – A coin 𝐶 can be divided into multiple, smaller pieces such that any 
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total value less than 𝐶 can be obtained. 
Since the field’s inception, electronic cash systems have been designed with privacy and 
security in mind first and foremost.  The intuition behind why the security property is 
useful for our purposes is as follows: if we had a suitable scheme, a source node 𝑠 could 
start with some amount of currency, say $1, and begin by distributing it to its neighbors.  
From there, each 𝑣 could add up its currency, report to 𝑠 on how much they have, and 
continue by transferring it to nodes at the next BFS level.  Under a suitable electronic 
cash scheme, the security property would guarantee mathematically that 𝑣 could not 
forge extra currency, thus enabling 𝑠 to accept 𝑣‘s report as is with no need for further 
verification.  The privacy property, on the other hand, is not useful for our purposes – 
there is no need for the source node 𝑠 to be unable to identify where a node 𝑣 pushed or 
received its currency from.  In fact, we have the opposite scenario:⁡𝑠 would be better off 
having as much information as possible about 𝑣’s currency.  This property is particularly 
limiting for our purposes as, indeed, practically all existing electronic cash schemes 
require substantial technical construction to ensure the privacy property is satisfied. 
 
Moreover, while the divisibility property is suitable for the purposes of electronic cash, it 
is not strong enough for our purposes: in fact, we need for coins⁡𝐶 to support arbitrary 
rational denominations 𝑚/𝑛.  No existing electronic cash scheme accomplishes this, and 
constructing one falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
We also must talk about transferability.  Assuming an offline scheme, this is obviously 
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necessary, but what is not as obvious is that nodes 𝑣 ≠ 𝑠 must have the capability to 
combine multiple coins 𝐶1, 𝐶2, … into one coin 𝐶.  This is because at each hop, a node 𝑢 
splits its coins based on deg⁡(𝑢), and as such, with no way of combining coins, the 
number of coins in circulation grows exponentially by BFS level.  This causes issues for 
both space and time complexity (as each⁡𝑣 would need to total up the value of its coins to 
report to 𝑠, which in turn would need to process this information).  Under the online 
setting, the situation is different: a node 𝑣 simply cashes in its coins at 𝑠, at which point 𝑠 
mints them a new coin valued at the total value of 𝑣’s coins.  Thus neither transferability 
(nodes push their currency by spending, not transferring) nor the requirement that coins 
can be combined are needed.  However, this creates a bottleneck at 𝑠, and indeed, this 
bottleneck is widely cited in the literature as a compelling reason electronic cash systems 
should aim for offlineness. 
 
We further continue this discussion in section VII. 
 
VII – OPEN PROBLEMS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have experimentally demonstrated the effectiveness of DownhillFlow in the 
centralized setting, both in terms of its results and its running time.  We have also made 
progress towards realizing an implementation of DownhillFlow in the distributed setting.  
However, we are not quite fully there: namely, our implementation of the distributed 
algorithm using accumulators is for the DF1 version of the algorithm (refer to section 
III), not DF3.  While DF1 was showed to obtain promising results in initial testing, its 
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results were worse than those of DF3 and we have not tested it under the same level of 
experimental rigor we have done for DF3.  To bridge this last gap, we need a way of 
assigning the tokens used by DF3 in a distributed, Sybil-resilient manner.  Recall that the 
tokens are numeric values that are unique and satisfy the condition that if 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 with 
𝑑𝑠(𝑢) > 𝑑𝑠(𝑣), we must have 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑢 > 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑣.  One idea may be to simply have each 
𝑣 coordinate with each of their same-level neighbors 𝑤 ∈ 𝑁(𝑣) to agree on a random 
orientation of each shared edge 𝑣𝑤: while this does not explicitly assign numeric tokens, 
it may be possible this approach would be effective in randomly ordering the nodes at an 
individual BFS level, the same result provided by the tokens. 
 
We also have not showed the robustness of DownhillFlow’s results theoretically.  While 
this does not take away from the fact that its results as is serve as a very good heuristic 
for computing trust vectors, we must take caution: lack of a mathematical foundation can 
open the protocol to theoretical corner cases that experimental testing may not have 
accounted for.  Mislove’s community detection [18] serves as an example of this, as 
while it was heuristically shown to obtain robust results on social networks in multiple 
studies (for instance [3, 10]), attacks exist that can cause it to deterministically admit 
every node in the Sybil region [2].  Moreover, understanding the mathematical 
foundation of the algorithm is the first step towards refining it into something more 
theoretically sound – it may, for instance, be possible that some improvements that would 
appear minor could be technicalities that can serve to mathematically guarantee “good” 
results. 
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We chose SybilGuard as the distributed protocol to compare DownhillFlow against; 
however, there is at least one other option, namely SybilLimit [28].  SybilLimit was 
introduced by Yu et al. as an improvement over SybilGuard, and was shown by Alvisi et 
al. [3] to achieve results more robust than (but qualitatively similar to) most existing 
random walk-based protocols.  Recall that the major difference proposed by SybilLimit 
over SybilGuard is that rather than running one, long random route of length 𝑙 for each 
node, it runs many iterations of the random routes, each with shorter length 𝑤 and 
different routing tables.  While the results demonstrated for SybilLimit in [3] look 
promising for our algorithm from a qualitative standpoint, a particularly notable instance 
of this being the DBLP graph with 𝑝 = 0.01, it is yet to be determined how SybilLimit 
performs in our experiments when tested with the same rigor. 
 
While we combined our results in section V using the average, it is not known if this is 
actually the best way to do so: given how DownhillFlow works, putting the results 
together in a different way may lead to more robust results.  In our initial testing, it 
appeared that actually, removing the highest 𝑘 trust values for each node and then taking 
the average led to higher precision at 50% recall (but the precision dropped off steeply 
afterward).  We suspect this is because this enforces the notion that a node 𝑣 must have 
high trust from many nodes, not just one, to rank highly in the overall ranking.  This stops 
Sybil nodes from being highly ranked just by sharing, for instance, one attack edge close 
to a source.  Furthermore, it is not known whether this type of approach could be 
generalized to other algorithms such as ACL. 
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Although we would need further guarantees for our purposes, constructing a rational-
valued electronic cash scheme is an interesting problem even when viewed entirely on its 
own.  While many schemes in the literature achieve divisibility, a core foundation of all 
of these schemes since electronic cash’s introduction in [9] is the principle that each coin 
be given a fixed, constant value, and the insight that this allows coins to be minted and 
spent in a disjoint, incremental manner.  As such, the schemes that achieve divisibility 
largely do so by requiring the existence of a minimum “base” value for which coins can 
be broken into.  For instance, in [21], divisibility is achieved using a hash tree that splits 
the values of coins in half repeatedly; however, without a base value (i.e., $0.01), this 
approach cannot yield exact results.  The scheme in [8] supports withdrawals of size 2𝑙 in 
a way that requires only 𝒪(𝑙 + 𝑘) time/space, where 𝑘 is a security parameter.  But in this 
scheme, each individual coin withdrawn still has a fixed value.  
 
To give an example of why this is insufficient for DownhillFlow’s purposes, we need 
only note that on the epinions graph at 𝑝 = 0.01, DownhillFlow computes trust values for 
some nodes on the order of 10
-10
.  DBLP fares even worse, at 10
-14
.  That means that to 
achieve accurate results, we would need to process over one hundred trillion coins, which 
is clearly not viable. 
 
Last, we discuss potential applications of DownhillFlow based on its running time.  In 
section V, we showed that DownhillFlow ran very quickly, averaging 0.099 seconds for 
epinions and 1.263 seconds for DBLP.  We also demonstrated that when ACL’s error 
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paremeter 𝜖 was set such that it ran at similar speeds, DownhillFlow’s results overtook 
those of ACL both in terms of robustness and the percent of honest nodes captured.    
However: is running time actually a significant advantage in practice? 
 
To look into this, we extrapolate towards what might happen on even larger graphs.  We 
consider the Tuenti graph [26] (|𝑉|  11M, |𝐸|  1.422b) as an observation point as there 
exist Sybil defense protocol studies [10] that have reported measurements of running 
times on this graph.  Some social graphs, however, are even larger, for instance 
sinaweibo (|𝑉|  20M), friendster (|𝑉|  65M) and the complete Facebook graph [16] (if 
we estimate based on the number of users, we have |𝑉| > 2.0b!). For the Tuenti graph, 
using the asymptotic bound for DownhillFlow, we could expect a running time of 
roughly 22.1 minutes (|𝑉| + |𝐸|  1.433b).  For ACL, on the other hand, an even lower 
value of 𝜖 may be required in order to capture the entire honest region of the graph.  
Based on the running times for epinions and DBLP, setting 𝜖 = 10-8 (i.e. reducing by 
another factor of 10) may yield running times of over 45.6 min * 10  7.5 hours.  This is 
already an improvement over SybilRank in [10], which claimed a (parallelized) running 
time of over 20 hours on Tuenti.  Since our implementations of DownhillFlow and ACL 
were not parallelized, it is likely the actual time improvement of both of these algorithms 
on larger graphs is greater. 
 
However, the people maintaining such graphs are likely social network operators, whose 
systems have very large live time.  As such, they would not be severely time constrained 
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and would most likely be better off investing in the costly algorithms to get the most 
precise results.  Social network operators could also take advantage of parallelization to 
speed up costly algorithms such as ACL.  So, if not larger graphs, where to go? 
 
We propose that the most suitable application for DownhillFlow is in dynamic networks.  
Such networks are not likely to be too large, and even for DBLP DownhillFlow finishes 
in slightly over a second.  Thus it does not need any added mechanisms to support 
addition/removal of nodes – the network operator can simply run the protocol and obtain 
a near-instant assessment of trust for the network at that time.  Other suitable applications 
most likely include hypothetical scenarios where a TTP wishes to generate personalized 
on-the-fly trust rankings for a node to use: we can, for instance, imagine a file-sharing 
system where a TTP keeps track of who trusts who, but provides no other services.  In 
that way, a node 𝑣 could call on the TTP for a personalized snapshot of “good” nodes for 
themselves before deciding which to work with.  However, the number of nodes with the 
desired file will be ≪ |𝑉|.  As such, both speed and high inclusivity are needed. 
 
Another scenario where high inclusivity is needed is, in fact, in online content voting.  As 
discussed previously in section II, there exists a protocol, SumUp [25], for Sybil defense 
in this context, and it is not clear whether DownhillFlow or SumUp obtains better results 
for it, especially since both are based around flow.  However, one thing that is apparent is 
that even though SumUp is claimed to be adaptable to the distributed setting, it isn’t 
under our restrictions: the method shown for this is simply for the source node 𝑠 to obtain 
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a trace of the entire graph.  As such, a more in-depth investigation may prove fruitful. 
 
VIII – CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we presented the Sybil defense algorithm DownhillFlow and demonstrated 
the robustness of its results experimentally.  We took steps towards implementing 
DownhillFlow in the distributed setting, showing a concrete approach based around a 
black-box cryptographic accumulator with weak assumptions and a link to the problem of 
constructing a non-private, rational-valued electronic cash scheme.  We showed that 
DownhillFlow’s results were more robust than those of SybilGuard, one of the few Sybil 
defense protocols in circulation today that retains the quality of being distributed.  We 
also showed results for ACL very similar to those obtained by Alvisi et al. in [3], which 
were more robust by a slight margin than those of DownhillFlow. 
We also analyzed DownhillFlow’s running time versus that of ACL, a community 
detection algorithm shown to obtain near-optimal trust ranking on several social graphs, 
and showed that not only was DownhillFlow significantly faster without measures to 
terminate ACL early, but that when ACL’s error parameter 𝜖 was adjusted enough to 
make it match DownhillFlow’s speed, DownhillFlow’s results were more robust both in 
terms of precision/recall and the proportion of honest nodes recognized.  This effect was 
most noticeable on larger graphs and under weaker attacks – for DBLP under a weaker 
attack, DownhillFlow identified 92.53% of the honest region at satisfactory precision, 
while ACL was only able to capture 31.10% of the honest region at all. 
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To our knowledge, we are the first both to 1) investigate Sybil defense protocols based 
around flow, and 2) report concrete running time measurements showing ACL’s 
robustness/speed tradeoff within the context of Sybil defense.  Based on DownhillFlow’s 
near-instant running time, we propose dynamic networks as its most promising 
application. 
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APPENDIX I 
PRECISION-RECALL CURVES GROUPED BY PROTOCOL AND ATTACK 
STRENGTH, ALL ITERATIONS 
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In this appendix, all precision-recall curves are presented, organized as in V: epinions 
(top-left), twitter (top-right), Slashdot (middle-left), LiveMocha (middle-right), DBLP 
(bottom).  Entries 1 ~ 6 are sorted by protocol and compare attack strengths against each 
other: the DownhillFlow, ACL and SybilGuard protocols are all shown.  The remaining 
entries, 7 ~ 13, are sorted by attack type and compare the protocols against each other: 
the random attack with 𝑝 = 0.01 … 0.09 and the fixed attack with weak and strong 
parameters are shown. 
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1) DownhillFlow, random model 
 
 
 
  
 62 
2) DownhillFlow, fixed model 
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3) ACL, random model 
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4) ACL, fixed model 
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5) SybilGuard, random model 
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6) SybilGuard, fixed model 
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7) Random attack, 𝑝 = 0.01 
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8) Random attack, 𝑝 = 0.03 
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9) Random attack, 𝑝 = 0.05 
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10) Random attack, 𝑝 = 0.07 
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11) Random attack, 𝑝 = 0.09 
 
 
 
  
 72 
12) Fixed attack, weak 
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13) Fixed attack, strong 
 
 
 
 
